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Abstract—We study optimal equilibria in turn based multi-
player mean-payoff games. Nash equilibria are a standard way
to define rational behaviour of different players in multi-player
games. These equilibria treat all players equally. We study
settings where a leader has additional power over the game:
she has the power to assign strategies to all participating
players, including herself. We argue that a leader who assign the
strategies, may not want to comply with the common restrictions
imposed by Nash equilibria. This setting provides the basis for
the quantitative analysis of the distributed systems, where the
leader can take the role of a controller or an adversary, while
the other players form a rational environment. We show that the
leader always has an optimal strategy in this setting, and that no
Nash equilibrium can be superior to it. Finding this equilibrium
is NP-complete and, for a fixed number of players, there is a
polynomial time reduction to solving two player mean-payoff
games.
I. INTRODUCTION
There has been a recent trend to replace traditional model
checking by quantitative model checking (see [11] for a recent
survey). In traditional model checking, a qualitative property
such as ‘a system is always eventually granted access to
a resource’, (♦access), is checked. This property can be
reflected by the deterministic Bu¨chi automata (DBA) from
Figures 1 and 2. The first automaton, A, shown in Figure
1 is in an accepting state whenever the process requests (and
is granted) access to a resource, while the second automaton
B, shown in Figure 2 is in an accepting state whenever the
player is granted access.
Traditionally, a DBA would accept an infinite play if the
accepting state is visited infinitely many times, and all of
these paths would be of equal quality. In quantitative model
checking, this qualitative measure is replaced by a quantitative
measure, where the quality of a path would be measured by
the limit average share of accepting states occurring in a run
of the DBA: it defines a mean-payoff condition. In this setting,
B refers to the limit average share of the time that a system’s
critical resource is used, while A refers to the limit average
frequency with which a process asks for (and receives) access
on an infinite path.
This inspired us to consider a setting, where different selfish
players follow different objectives defined by such DBAs. In
our example from Figures 3 and 4, the environment consists
of two selfish players who want to maximise the frequency in
which they are granted access to a critical resource (using A
for their respective objective), while the control objective of
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Fig. 2. g = ga ∨ gb ∨ g′a ∨ g′b, r = r′a ∨ rb′ ∨ ra ∨ rb ∨ ε
Two property automata: Figure 1 and Figure 2
the system is to maximise the utilisation of the system (using
B for this objective).
In some states of this model the players have choices. In our
example, the two players have the choice to make two different
kinds of requests, ra (resp. r′a for the second player), which
shall trigger an access for just one time unit, represented by
ga (resp. g′a for the second player), or a request rb (resp. r
′
b),
which shall trigger an access for three time units, represented
by three gb (resp. g′b). They can also use a local ε move.
In order to keep the model simple, we focus on models
where, on each state, there is one player who resolves the
choice. The states in which a player resolves the choice are
depicted as squares. Slightly more general, we consider mean-
payoff games (MPGs) [25], [12], [9], [2], [20], [3], [6]. MPGs
are finite turn-based games of infinite duration. They are
played on a game arena – a directed graph, whose vertices are
owned by different players. An MPG is played by placing a
token on a vertex, and allowing the player who owns the vertex
to push the token forward along an edge in the arena. Thus,
the players successively create an infinite play. The edges of
the game hold rewards for each player, and the objective of
each player is to maximise her limit average reward. Figure 5
depicts the multi-player mean-payoff game defined by players
from Figures 3 and 4 with their respective properties.
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Fig. 4. The rational environments (Figure 3) and the system (Figure 4),
shown as automata that coordinate on joint actions.
The way each player plays can be captured by a strategy. A
set of strategies, one for each player, is called a strategy profile.
A strategy profile is in a Nash equilibrium if no player has
an incentive for unilateral deviation, i.e., if all other players
adhere to their strategy, a player cannot increase her payoff by
changing her strategy. Nash equilibria [18], [16], [23], [19],
[8] are a common way to describe stable strategies with the in-
tuition that only if no player gains from changing her strategy
unilaterally, the strategy will be maintained. Qualitative Nash
equilibria have been used to refine a worst case analysis. In
[11], for example, the distributed development of a system
is considered, where teams develop components that try to
e′ r e
e
r r
r e′
(0, 0, 1)
(0, 0, 1)
(0, 1, 1)
(1, 0, 1)
−→
0
−→
0
−→
0 (0, 1, 1)
−→
0(1, 0, 1)
(0, 0, 1)
(0, 0, 1)
−→
0(0, 1, 1)
−→
0
−→
0
(1, 0, 1)
(0, 0, 1)
(0, 0, 1)
(0, 0, 1)
(0, 0, 1)
(0, 1, 1)
−→
0
−→
0
(1, 0, 1)
−→
0
−→
0
−→
0
Fig. 5. The multi-player mean-payoff game from the properties from Figures
1,2 and 3,4. The nodes are labelled by the players who own them, e and e′
for the rational environment players, and r for the system player. The payoff
is shown in the order payoff for e, e′, r.
establish individual specifications. In this symmetric setting, a
component can safely be assumed not to be malicious to the
extent that, for harming others, it would sacrifice compliance
with its main objective. Within this constraint, however, it is
conservatively considered to be adversarial.
In this paper, we raise the question of how an interested
party, henceforth called a leader, can capitalise on setting an
equilibrium strategy. The question we set out to answer can
therefore be phrased as:
How should a reflective leader control a system?
When we view the leader as adversarial, we can use the
same techniques to determine how she can coordinate an attack
on the system to minimise the payoff.
If we allow the leader to select the complete strategy profile,
the question whether achieving a Nash equilibrium is the right
target for her begs to be asked. The constraints on the strategies
of the other players are clearly a pre-requisite for a stable
strategy, but how about hers? If the leader can select strategies
that she can improve over, she has more leeway when selecting
a strategy profile. We therefore argue that she should be
allowed to ‘discriminate’ against herself. As we will show
in Section III-A that the leader may suffer from restricting her
strategy in the Nash sense. Note that this effect does not occur
in the qualitative setting, where such an equilibrium would also
be Nash.
In mean-payoff games based on quantitative specifications,
studying a leader of this type has numerous natural justifica-
tions. For example, we might seek optimal control of a system
that is used by the external players, who are not under our
control, but to whom we can communicate the rules of its use.
It is natural to assume that the rules will only be complied
with, if the external players have no incentive to deviate,
while the controller can take a higher perspective and take
the indirect effect (in form of non-compliance by the external
players) of her deviation into account when setting the rules.
Similarly, an adversarial leader has to take the rationality of
the external players involved into account, but she can herself
resolve the remaining nondeterminism in the system in any
way that complies with this constraint.
In our example, the leader will seek to maximise (in the
controller model) resp. minimise (in the attacker model) the
time any process is using the critical resource, while the
individual processes attempt to maximise their own access to
it.
In software engineering, the environment is often regarded
as antagonistic. This relates to a two player zero-sum game,
where the environment forms a monolithic block whose gains
and losses are the losses and gain, respectively, of the system,
represented by the leader in our setting.
A. Results
A first result is the introduction of the concept of leader
equilibria and leader strategy profiles. A leader strategy profile
is a relaxation of a Nash equilibrium, where all players except
for the leader do not benefit from unilaterally changing their
respective strategy. They are the strategy profiles the leader can
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enforce: in all other strategy profiles, rational players would
refuse to follow her, as they would have preferable options.
We call optimal leader strategy profiles leader equilibria.
While they are equilibria in the sense that no participating
player benefits from deviation, they are equilibria on a different
level: while the effect of unilateral deviation of the remaining
players is considered in a Nash sense, the leader takes the
effect on the stability of the strategy profile into account.
We show that leader equilibria always exist and that no
Nash equilibrium can be superior over them, where the latter
is a simple corollary from the fact that each Nash equilibrium
is in particular a leader strategy profile. We establish the NP
completeness of the related decision problem ‘is there a leader
equilibrium with payoff greater or equal to a threshold’ (which
equals the bound for Nash equilibria [24]), and sharpen this
bound by showing that they cannot be approximated. We also
show that the NP hardness depends on the number of players:
for a bounded number of players, we give a polynomial time
reduction to solving two player mean-payoff games (2MPGs).
As the complexity of solving two player MPGs is wide
open, we cannot hope for determining the precise complexity
for solving MPGs with a bounded number of players without
solving their complexity first. However, we get simple corol-
laries for the complexity of finding leader and Nash equilibria
for a bounded number of players: it can be done in pseudo
polynomial time [6], it can be done in smoothed polynomial
time [3], there are fast randomised [2] and deterministic [20]
strategy improvement algorithms, and the decision problem is
in UP∩CoUP [12], [25].
B. Related Work
The existence of Nash equilibria in multi-player mean-
payoff games has been established in [26]. Ummels and
Wojtczak [24] studied the complexity of determining the
existence of Nash equilibria, where each reward falls into a
given closed interval in multi-player mean-payoff games. Both
sides of the NP completeness proofs are closely related to ours.
A key ingredient of using reward and punish strategy profiles
for mean-payoff games are inspired by [24], [5] and similar
strategies in stateless games [27].
In [22], Ummels has studied the concept of subgame perfect
equilibrium for the case of infinite games. He has given simple
examples to show that subgame perfect equilibrium, where
choice of strategy should be such that it is optimal for initial
history of the game and not for just initial vertex, exists in the
case of infinite games.
There are quite a few works on optimal equilibria, in
particular on equilibria that are ‘best for society’, which is
usually defined as the optimal sum. This definition is, for
example, used in the definition of the Price of Anarchy [15] for
network and internet related games, or in traffic routing games
[1], [10]. In [17], the authors study a virus inoculation game
on social networks, in which players think of their neighbour’s
welfare. In [7], the authors have modelled a society game
and shown how the equilibria are affected if players think
of society rather than thinking of themselves.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A multi-player mean-payoff game (MMPG) is a tuple
〈P, V, {Vp | p ∈ P}, v0, E, {rp : E → Q | p ∈ P}〉, where
• P is a set of players,
• V is a set of vertices with a designated initial vertex
v0 ∈ V ,
• {Vp | p ∈ P} is a partition of the vertices V ,
• E ⊆ V × V is a set of edges, such that each vertex has
a successor (∀v ∈ V ∃v′ ∈ V, (v, v′) ∈ E), and
• {rp | p ∈ P} is a family of reward functions rp : E → Q,
that assign, for each player p ∈ P , a reward to each
transition to p.
An MMPG is intuitively played by placing a token on the
initial vertex. Each time the token is on the vertex of a player
p, player p chooses an outgoing transition and moves the token
along this transition. This way, the players jointly construct an
infinite play pi ∈ V ω . For each player p, a play pi = v0, v1 . . .
is evaluated to
rp(pi) = lim inf
n→∞
1
n
n−1∑
i=0
rp
(
(vi, vi+1)
)
.
If the reward functions sum up to 0, i.e., if
∑
p∈P
rp(e) = 0
holds for all edges e ∈ E, then we call the MMPG a zero-sum
game.
The way that the respective players choose the successor
vertex is a function σp : V ∗Vp → V from an initial sequence
of a play that ends in some vertex v ∈ Vp of player p to a
vertex v′, such that (v, v′) ∈ E. A family of strategies σ =
{σp | p ∈ P} is called a strategy profile. A strategy profile
σ defines a unique play piσ , and therefore a reward rp(σ) =
rp(piσ) for each player p.
A strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium if no player has
an incentive to change her strategy, provided that all other
players keep theirs. That is, if, for all players p ∈ P and
for all σ′ = {σ′q | q ∈ P} with σq = σ′q for all q 6= p,
rp(σ) ≥ rp(σ′) holds.
For a designated leader l ∈ P , a strategy profile is a leader
strategy profile if no other player has an incentive to deviate
from her strategy. That is, if, for all players p ∈ P r {l} and
for all σ′ = {σ′q | q ∈ P} with σq = σ′q for all q 6= p,
rp(σ) ≥ rp(σ′) holds. Thus, a leader strategy profile allows
for solutions, where the leader could improve upon her reward
by changing her strategy. While this may on first glance not be
in the interest of a leader, we will see that she can obtain better
results with leader strategy profiles than with Nash equilibria.
We use two player zero-sum mean-payoff games (2MPGs)
to determine the outcome of MMPGs when, from some point
onwards, one player, say p, is playing against all others, where
the objective of p is inherited from the multi-player MPG,
while the objective of the remaining players is to minimise her
reward. As the objective of the remaining players is defined
by the objective of p, we use only rp to describe the objective
of the game. The 2MPG for p of an MMPGM = 〈P, V, {Vp |
p ∈ P}, v0, E, {rp : E → Q | p ∈ P}〉, denoted 2mpg(M, p),
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is therefore the game 〈P, V, {Vp, V r Vp}, v0, E, rp〉. 2MPGs
have optimal memoryless strategies for both players, and the
outcome is, when starting in any vertex v ∈ V , determined
[25]. By abuse of notation, we denote this value for a vertex
v by rp(v).
III. LEADER EQUILIBRIA
A leader strategy profile that provides the maximal reward
for the leader among all leader strategy profiles is called a
leader equilibrium. In the remainder, we show that
1) leader equilibria are generally better (for the leader) than
Nash equilibria (Theorem 3.2),
2) determining if there is a strategy profile σ with rl(σ) =
1, such that the strategy profile σ is a Nash equilibrium
or leader strategy profile is NP hard even for zero-sum
MMPGs with reward functions whose domain is {−1, 1}
(Theorem 3.3), and the optimal reward of the leader
cannot be approximated efficiently (Corollary 3.4), and
3) leader equilibria (and optimal Nash equilibria) always
exist, and, for a fixed set of players, finding them in
MMPGs is polynomial time reducible to solving two
player MPGs (Corollary 3.16).
For social optima, it suffices to add a social reward to
the reward function, e.g., the sum of the individual rewards,
without letting the respective player own any vertex. The
technique introduced in this paper can then be used to optimise
the social payoff.
We start with a trivial inference of the existence of leader
strategy profiles.
Lemma 3.1: Leader strategy profiles exist for all multi-
player mean-payoff games.
Proof: It is shown in [5] that Nash equilibria for multi-
player mean-payoff games exist. By definition, any strategy
profile in Nash equilibrium, is also a leader strategy profile.
What remains to be shown is that optimal leader strategy
profiles (i.e., leader equilibria) exist, but that the optimum can
be taken is implied by the construction from Section III-C (cf.
Corollary 3.11).
A. Superiority of leader equilibria
In this subsection, we show that leader equilibria are
superior over Nash equilibria: a benign leader who assigns
strategies in such a way that she only makes sure that no other
player has an incentive to deviate, while allowing for the use
of ‘modest’ strategies that she can improve upon when the
other players stick to their strategies, is more successful than
a leader who follows the short sighted egoistic approach to
chose only among strategies she cannot improve upon herself.
On first glance, it may not seem to be in the interest of the
leader to be benign. To the contrary, it would seem that the
leader could improve upon such strategy profiles by simply
adjusting her strategy. A second look, however, reveals that
she has to comply with less constraints and can, consequently,
choose from a larger pool of strategy profiles. In particular, this
implies that the optimum cannot be worse.
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Fig. 6. An MMPG, where the leader equilibrium is strictly better than all
Nash equilibria. The rewards are depicted in the order first player, leader,
passive player. The rewards on the edges (1, 2), (1, 4), (2, 3), and (2, 5)
is not shown, because these edges can only be taken once in a play. Their
rewards therefore have no impact on the payoff for any player.
The MMPG from Figure 6 exemplifies why this may lead
to an increased payoff. It shows a simple MMPG with five
vertices, 1 through 5, where the leader owns vertex 2, and a
player first owns the initial vertex, vertex 1. The other vertices
have exactly one successor (themselves), such that it does not
matter who owns them. We assume that they are assigned to
a third player, player passive.
Initially, player first can either play to vertex 4, or to vertex
2. When playing to vertex 4, every player will receive a payoff
of 0. When she plays to vertex 2, the leader can either move
on to vertex 3, securing herself a payoff of 2, to the cost of
the first and the passive player, who both receive a payoff of
−1. Alternatively, she could play to vertex 5, where both the
leader and the first player receive a payoff of 1, to the cost of
the passive player, whose payoff is −2. In a Nash equilibrium,
the leader will never move to vertex 5, as she can improve
over such strategies by simply choosing to go to vertex 3.
Consequently, the first player will not move to vertex 2 in any
Nash equilibrium, as this would result in a payoff of −1 for
her, such that moving to vertex 4 is preferable. Thus, the only
play produced by a Nash equilibrium is the play 1 · 4ω .
But the leader has a better leader equilibrium: she can
benignly waive her option to move to vertex 3, and instead
move to vertex 5. Then, it becomes preferable for the first
player to move to vertex 2. This results in an improved reward
for the leader.
Theorem 3.2: Nash equilibria cannot be superior to leader
equilibria, and leader equilibria can be strictly better than all
Nash equilibria.
B. NP hardness
In order to establish NP hardness, we reduce the satisfia-
bility of a 3SAT formula over n atomic propositions with m
conjuncts to solving a zero-sum MMPG with 2n+ 1 players
and 4m+ 2n+ 1 vertices that uses only payoffs 0 and 1. We
consider the reduction for the example of the 3SAT formula
C1 ∧C2 ∧C3 with C1 = p∨¬q ∨¬r, C2 = ¬p∨ q ∨¬r, and
C3 = ¬p ∨ ¬q ∨ ¬r.
The 2n + 1 players consist of 2n players for the 2n
literals corresponding to the n variables, and the leader who
intuitively tries to validate the formula. The game is played in
two phases, an initial formula phase, and a subsequent payoff
phase.
In the formula phase, the leader cycles through the m
disjuncts, where we denote her vertices by C1 through Cm. In
each of these vertices, she selects a literal, e.g., (C1, p) from
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C1 in the example. Such a vertex is owned by the player of
this literal, e.g., (C1, p) is owned by p. This literal player can
either move to an absorbing vertex, or move to the next literal
(when in conjunct 1 through m− 1) or to a designated vertex
in the evaluation phase (when in conjunct m).
In the evaluation phase, all nodes are owned by the leader.
The leader cycles through the atomic propositions, either
taking an edge to p, where player ¬p receives a payoff of 0
while all other players receive a payoff of 1, or to ¬p, where
player p receives a payoff of 0 while all other players receive
a payoff of 1. The absorbing sink has only one self-loop with
payoff 1 for all literal players and 0 for the leader.
For the example formula, the leader has a
leader equilibrium which constructs the path
C1, (C1, p), C2, (C2, q), C3, (C3,¬r),
(
p, q,¬r)ω .
This path provides a payoff of 1 to the leader and the players
p, q, and ¬r, and a payoff of 23 for the remaining players.
No player has therefore an incentive to deviate unilaterally,
and it is clear that such a play exists whenever the formula
is satisfiable. Thus, for satisfiable formulas, there is a leader
equilibrium with payoff 1 for the leader.
If the formula is not satisfiable, any run that ends up in the
evaluation phase would have to path by (Ci, p) and (Cj ,¬p)
for some atomic proposition p. But then, the sum of the
payoffs of these players is at most 2 − 1n , and hence at least
one of these players receives a payoff < 1. This player has
an incentive to deviate by going to the sink instead. Thus,
all leader stable strategy profiles end in the sink vertex for
unsatisfiable formulas, and a leader equilibrium has a payoff
of 0 for the leader.
a) Zero-sum games: To progress from here to zero sum
games, we can simply replace the rewards of 0 to −1 and add
(n − 1) additional players who own no vertex and always
have a reward of −1. The result that these games cannot be
approximated clearly carries over.
Theorem 3.3: The decision problem of whether or not a
leader strategy profile or Nash equilibrium σ with reward
rl(σ) = 1 of the leader exists in games with rewards in {0, 1}
resp. zero sum games with rewards in {−1, 1}, such that the
reward of the leader is always in {0, 1} resp. {−1, 1} is NP
complete.
The proof is closely related to the NP hardness proof from
[24].
Corollary 3.4: Unless P=NP, no tractable algorithm can
approximate the optimal reward of the leader closer than 0.5.
C. Reward and punish strategy profiles for leader equilibria
Let us consider a leader strategy profile σ. We first show that
we can obtain a leader strategy profile with a similar payoff
for the leader by applying a punishment to the first player who
deviates from σ. The power to define the equilibrium allows
the leader to use the power of all remaining players to punish
this deviator.
That is, we use a strategy profile where all players co-
operate to produce piσ . Note that the leader solicits co-
operation from every player who owns some vertex in the
game. Further, the strategy profile σ offers the reward rp(piσ)
to a player p, which is at least as good as the reward that player
p would have received in the two player game 2mpg(M, p)
from any vertex in ver(piσ). But, if a player deviates from σ,
all other players co-operate to harm this player, throwing their
own interests to the wind.
Thus, not complying with the requirement to produce piσ
will lead to a payoff of the deviating player, which equals the
payoff of this player in a two player game that starts at the
point of her deviation, i.e., at the vertex owned by her, where
she is supposed to play in accordance with σ. We call any
such strategy profile a reward and punish strategy profile and
define it as a σ that offers reward rp(piσ) to a player p and
any deviation from σ by a player p will eventually lead her to
get a (not necessarily strictly) lower payoff than rp(piσ).
Note that, for reward and punish strategy profile, piσ essen-
tially defines σ.
Lemma 3.5: If σ is a leader strategy profile, then there is a
reward and punish strategy profile σ′, which is also a leader
strategy profile and defines the same play piσ = piσ′ . If σ is a
Nash equilibrium, so is σ′.
Proof: We first observe that piσ alone defines the reward
of all players for the strategy profile σ and thus, due to piσ =
piσ′ , of σ′.
Let us assume for contradiction that a player p ∈ P for
Nash equilibria resp. p ∈ P r {l} for leader strategy profiles
has an incentive to deviate from her strategy in σ′. Then her
payoff in σ′ will be determined by the result of the two player
zero-sum MPG ‘her against the rest’ as defined by the reward
and punish strategy profiles. Note that the initial play up to
this point has no impact on the limit reward.
But she can deviate from her strategy in σ at the same
position with at least the same reward, by simply assuming
that she plays against all other players in the same game.
Consequently, she has an incentive to deviate in the strategy
profile σ, too, which contradicts the assumption that σ is a
Nash equilibrium resp. leader strategy profile.
This observation allows us to concentrate on reward and
punish strategy profiles only. Let ver(pi) be the set of vertices
that occur in a play, and let own(S) = {p ∈ P | S ∩ Vp 6= ∅}
be the set of players that own some vertex in S. With these
terms, it is simple to characterise reward and punish strategy
profiles.
Lemma 3.6: For an MMPG M, a play piσ is the outcome
of a reward and punish strategy profile σ, which is a Nash
equilibrium resp. leader strategy profile, if, and only if, for all
vertices v ∈ ver(pi) and all players p ∈ own(ver(piσ)) resp.
p ∈ own(ver(piσ)) r {l} that control a vertex that occurs in
the play, it holds that rp(piσ) ≥ rp(v).
Proof: To show the ‘if’ direction, we assume for contra-
diction that rp(piσ) < rp(v) holds for some vertex v ∈ ver(pi),
which is owned by p (resp. owned by p 6= l). Then player p
can improve on her strategy by following her strategy until v is
reached, and henceforth follow the strategy from 2mpg(M, p).
As the initial play does not influence the limit inferior, her
payoff would be at least rp(v), which is strictly greater than
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rp(piσ).  
To show the ‘only if’ direction, we assume for contradiction
that rp(piσ) ≥ rp(v) holds, but no reward and punish strategy
profile defines piσ . Assume that player p, deviates in vertex
v from piσ . Then the other players will join to diminish her
payoff henceforth. Taking into account that the initial sequence
up to this point has no influence on the the payoffs, they
can follow the optimal strategy of the opponents of p from
2mpg(M, p), restricting the payoff of player p to rp(v).  
In the next step, we show that we can determine the
existence of a well behaved reward and punish strategy profile
that satisfies such a constraint system. A strategy profile is
well behaved if the ratio in which every edge occurs has
a limit, that is, if, for all edges (s, t) ∈ E, there is a
r(s,t) = lim
n→∞
#(s,t)n (piσ)
n , where #
(s,t)
n (v0, v1, v2 . . .) =
∣∣{i <
n | (vi, vi+1) = (s, t)}
∣∣ is the number of edges (s, t) among
the first n edges that occur in a play v0, v1, v2 . . .. (This limit
does not necessarily exist for general strategy profiles.)
b) Linear programs for well behaved reward and
punish strategy profiles: The first central observation is that,
if we already know
• the set of vertices Q visited in piσ and
• a (strongly connected) set S of vertices such that S ⊆ Q
contains all vertices that are visited infinitely often (and
is therefore strongly connected),
then we can infer a constraint system by Lemma 3.6, which is
necessary and sufficient for a well behaved reward and punish
strategy profile. The constraint system consists of two parts.
One part is the ratios, where we use the p(s,t) from above for
edges (s, t) ∈ E∩S×S, and similarly pv for the limit ratio of
each vertex v in S. (Obviously, the limit ratio of each vertex
not in S and of each edge not in S × S must be 0.)
This provides a first part of a constraint system, namely
• the ratio of vertices and edges that are not in S resp.
S × S is 0,
– pv = 0 for all v ∈ V r S and
– pe = 0 for all e ∈ E r S × S,
• the ratio of vertices and edges that are in S resp. S × S
is ≥ 0,
– pv ≥ 0 for all v ∈ S and
– pe ≥ 0 for all e ∈ E ∩ S × S,
• the sum of the ratio of vertices is 1,
∑
v∈V
pv = 1,
• the ratio of a vertex is the sum of the ratios of its incoming
edges and
the ratio of a vertex is the sum of the ratios of its outgoing
edges,
– ps =
∑
t.(s,t)∈E
p(s,t) for all s ∈ S and
– pt =
∑
s.(s,t)∈E
p(s,t) for all t ∈ S.
The second part of the constraint system stems from
Lemma 3.6. For a well behaved strategy profile σ, rp(piσ) =∑
e∈E perp(e) is simply the weighted sum of the rewards of
the individual edges. This provides us with a constraint∑
e∈E
perp(e) ≥ max
v∈Q
(rp(v))
for all p ∈ own(Q) for Nash equilibria, and for all p ∈
own(Q)r {l} for a leader strategy profile.
Before we define the objective function, we state a simple
corollary from Lemma 3.6.
Corollary 3.7: Every well behaved reward and punish strat-
egy profile satisfies these constraints, and every well behaved
strategy profile σ, whose play piσ satisfies these constraints,
defines a reward and punish strategy profile.
The objective of the leader is obviously to maximise
rl(piσ) =
∑
e∈E perl(e). Once we have this linear pro-
gramming problem, it is simple to determine a solution in
polynomial time [13], [14].
The relevant points are first to establish that a well behaved
reward and punish strategy profile exists for each such solu-
tion, and second, to show that non-well behaved reward and
punish strategy profiles cannot be preferable for the leader.
c) From Q, S, and a solution to the linear programs
to a well behaved reward and punish strategy profile:
We start with the simple case that the vertices and edges with
non-0 ratio are strongly connected.
We design piσ as follows. We first go from the initial vertex
v0 through states in Q to some state in S. (Note that this initial
path has no bearing on the limit inferior that defines the payoff
of the individual players.)
Once we have reached S, we intuitively keep a list for each
vertex in S. In this list, we keep the number of times each
outgoing edge with non-0 ratio has been taken. We also apply
an arbitrary (but fixed) order on the outgoing edges. Each time
we are in this vertex, we choose the first edge (according to
this order) that has been taken less often (from this vertex)
than pepv , the ratio pe of the edge divided by the ratio pv of
this vertex, suggests. If no such edge exists, we take the first
edge.
Lemma 3.8: An implementation of such a list is finite: let
re be the ratio of an outgoing edge e of a vertex v divided
by the ratio of the vertex v it emerges from, and let d be the
least common denominator of these ratios for a vertex v. Then
we can re-set the counters for the outgoing edges to 0 after d
steps.
The result is obviously a well behaved strategy profile and
the first part of the constraint system is clearly satisfied. It
therefore suffices to convince ourselves that the second part is
satisfied as well.
Now assume for contradiction that this is not the case. Let qv
and qe be the real ratio of the vertices and edges, respectively.
Note that our simple rule for the selection of vertices implies
that pepv is correct for all edges e = (v, v
′) ∈ E ∩ S × S.
Then there must be a vertex v ∈ S, which has the highest
factor qvpv . As it is the highest factor, none of its predecessors
in E ∩ S × S can have a higher ratio; consequently, they
must have the same ratio. By a simple inductive argument,
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this expands to the complete strongly connected set of non-
0 vertices. As
∑
v∈S pv = 1 =
∑
v∈S qv holds, this implies
pv = qv for all v ∈ S.
To extend this argument to the general case, we first observe
that the non-0 vertices and edges form islands of (maximal)
SC parts C1, through Ck. We use this observation to compose
a play as follows.
We start with an initial part, a transfer from v0 to C1 as
in the simple case. We then continue by playing a C11 part, a
transfer, a C12 part, a transfer, . . ., a C
1
k part, transfer C
2
1 , and
so forth. To achieve a well behaved strategy profile we do the
following.
1) We fix the ratio
∑
i C
i
1 :
∑
i C
i
2 : . . . :
∑
i C
i
k according
to the the sum of the pv for vertices v in the respective
component. This ratio never changes, and it is given by
natural numbers c1, c2, . . . , ck, such that c1 : c2 : . . . : ck
satisfies this ratio.
2) We let Cij grow slowly with i. We can, for example, use
i · cj .
Note that the transfer part has constant length, bounded
by |S|. Thus the limit ratio of transfer is 0.
3) We let the transfer to Cij+1 go to the vertex, in which
Cij was left. Note that the transfer may contain vertices
of various components, but as the overall ratio of the
transfer is 0, this does not affect the limit probability.
Consequently, we can use the controller from the simple
case of one SCC for the sequence C1i , C
2
i , C
3
i . . ., which
only focuses on the relevant part of the ith component.
In effect, we have simple controllers for the individual
components, and a single counting controller that manages
the transfer between the components.
It is easy to see that the resulting controller inherits the
correct ratios from the simple individual controllers. Together
with Corollary 3.7 we get:
Theorem 3.9: If the linear program from above for sets Q
of reachable states and S of states visited infinitely often has
a solution, then there is a well behaved reward and punish
strategy profile that meets this solution.
Finally, we show that non-well behaved reward and punish
strategy profiles cannot provide a better solution than the one
provided by the previous theorem.
Theorem 3.10: For given sets Q and S, non-well behaved
reward and punish strategy profiles cannot provide better
rewards for the leader than the reward rl for the leader
obtained by the well behaved reward and punish strategy
profiles described above.
Proof: We have shown in Lemma 3.6 that there exists
a well defined constraint system obeyed by all reward and
punish strategy profiles with set Q of reachable states and all
p ∈ own(Q) for Nash, and for all p ∈ own(Q) r {l} for the
leader strategy profile. Let us assume for contradiction that
there is a reward and punish strategy profile σ that defines a
play piσ with a strictly better reward rl(piσ) = rl+ ε for some
ε > 0.
Let k be some position in piσ such that, for all i ≥ k,
only positions in the infinity set S of piσ occur. Let pi be the
tail vkvk+1vk+2 . . . of piσ that starts in position k. Obviously
rp(pi) = rp(piσ) holds for all players p ∈ P .
We observe that, for all δ > 0, there is an l ∈ N such that,
for all m ≥ l, 1m
∑m−1
i=0 rp
(
(vi, vi+1)
)
> rp(pi)− δ holds for
all p ∈ P , as otherwise the limit inferior property would be
violated.
We now fix, for all a ∈ N, a sequence pia =
vkvk+1vk+2 . . . vk+ma , such that vk+ma+1 = vk and
1
m
∑ma−1
i=0 rp
(
(vi, vi+1)
)
> rp(pi)− 1a holds for all p ∈ P .
Let pi0 = v0v1 . . . vk−1. We now select pi′ =
pi0pi1
b1pi2
b2pi3
b3 . . ., where the bi are natural numbers big
enough to guarantee that bi·|pii||pii+1|+|pi0|+
∑i
j=1 bj ·|pij |
≥ 1 − 1i
holds.
Letting bi grow this fast ensures that the payoff, which is at
least rp(pi) − 1i for all players p ∈ P , dominates till the end
of the first iteration1 of |pii+1|.
The resulting play belongs to a well behaved (as the limit
exists) strategy profile, and can thus be obtained by a well
behaved reward and punish strategy profile by Lemma 3.6.
It thus provides a solution to the linear program from above,
which contradicts our assumption.
In particular, Theorems 3.9 and 3.10 imply together with
Lemma 3.1 the existence of a leader equilibrium.
Corollary 3.11: Leader equilibria exist for all multi-player
mean-payoff games.
d) Decision & optimisation procedures: The decision
problem related to the construction of optimal equilibria asks
whether or not, for a given threshold rthld, there exists a
strategy profile σ, which is a Nash equilibrium resp. leader
strategy profile and provides a reward rl(piσ) ≥ rthld for the
leader.
In Lemma 3.6 and Theorem 3.10 we have established that it
is enough to consider well behaved reward and punish strategy
profiles. The relevant behaviour of these strategy profiles is
captured by the set of reachable vertices, the set of infinite
vertices S, and the ratio of the edges in E ∩ S × S.
We use this observation in various algorithms, starting with
a nondeterministic one.
Theorem 3.12: For an MMPGM and a threshold rthld, the
respective decision problem for leader strategy profiles and
Nash equilibria is NP complete, both in the general case and
when restricted to zero-sum games with payoffs in {−1, 1}.
Proof: We use nondeterminism to first guess a set Q
of visited vertices, a set S of vertices visited infinitely often
and then the linear program defined by them and a solution
thereof. Note that the linear program is polynomial inM and,
consequently, has a polynomial solution.
After having a closer look at the sets Q and S, we can check
that there is a possible path from the initial vertex to S, that S
is strongly connected, that Q and S define the guessed linear
program, its constraint system is satisfied by the solution and
the reward of the leader is at least the threshold rthld given.
1Including the first iteration of pii+1 is a technical necessity, as a complete
iteration of pii+i provides better guarantees, but without the inclusion of this
guarantee, the pij ’s might grow too fast, preventing the existence of a limes.
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All of these tests can obviously be performed in polynomial
time.
The respective hardness results have been established in
Theorem 3.12.
Although there is no perfectly fitting lemma or theorem for
citing in, the inclusion in NP could have been inferred from
[24], and the techniques used there are quite similar to ours.
We re-proved it as we need the intermediate results below.
The hardness result uses a polynomial number of players.
This raises a question if the complexity is better for a bounded
number of up to k players.
We first assume that we are already provided with solutions
to the 2MPGs toM. To devise a decision procedure, we start
with a simple observation:
Lemma 3.13: For a given MMPGM with k players and n
vertices, there are at most (n+ 1)k many different thresholds
in the related linear programs.
Proof: For each player p, there is either the threshold
rp(v) for some vertex v of M, or no restriction on the
threshold at all in Part II of the constraint system of a linear
program.
Consequently, we only have to consider the most liberal
constraint systems.
Lemma 3.14: For a given MMPGM with k players and n
vertices and a threshold as referred to in the proof of Lemma
3.13, it suffices to refer to up to n first parts of the constraint
system of the linear programming problem.
Proof: For each Part II of the constraint system as referred
to in the proof of Lemma 3.13, it is easy to determine the
maximal set Q of nodes that can be visited. For this maximal
Q, we can determine the strongly connected components S1,
S2, . . . of (V,E)∩Q that are reachable from the initial vertex
v0. Obviously, there are at most n of them.
It is now easy to see that, for all Q′, S′ that define Part
II of the constraint system, Q′ is contained in Q and S′ is
contained in one SCC Si from above. Now Q and Si define
a more liberal Part I of a constraint system than Q′ and S′.
Thus, every solution for Q′ and S′ is a solution for Q and Si,
too.
Thus, for a given k, there are only polynomially many
linear programming problems to consider, and they are easy
to construct. Solving linear programming problems requires
only polynomial time [14], [13]. We thus obtain the following
theorem.
Theorem 3.15: If we are provided with the solutions to
the 2MPGs defined by an MMPG with a fixed number k
of players, then we can determine an optimal solution in
polynomial time.
Corollary 3.16: MMPGs with a fixed number of players
can be solved in polynomial time by a machine with an oracle
for solving two player zero-sum MPGs. If 2MPGs are solvable
in polynomial time, so are MMPGs with a fixed number of
players.
D. Reduction to two player mean-payoff games
Thus, finding optimal strategy profiles in MMPGs with
a fixed number of players can be derived from solutions
to 2MPGs. Various works have been published on solving
2MPGs. In [6], the authors give an improved pseudopoly-
nomial procedure to solve two player mean-payoff games.
[2] provides a randomised strongly subexponential and pseu-
dopolynomial algorithm, and [12], [25] contain an UP∩CoUP
algorithm for the respective decision problems. There are
wilder reductions like one to symbolic linear programming
[21] and a smoothed polynomial time complexity [3].
Corollary 3.16 therefore provides the following:
Corollary 3.17: MMPGs with a fixed number of players
can be solved in UP∩coUP, in pseudo polynomial time, in
smoothed polynomial time, and in randomised subexponential
time.
IV. DISCUSSION
The two main contributions of this paper are the intro-
duction of leader equilibria and the concept of well behaved
reward and punish strategy profiles as a technical foundation
to them.
Well behaved reward and punish strategy profiles are general
instruments for optimising the payoff of one player, while
projecting away problems like the potential non-existence of
limit average values. It is our belief that they will be useful
in many related optimisation problems. The introduction of
leader equilibria is a conceptual change to Nash equilibria,
where an interested party overcomes the antinomy of Nash
equilibria exemplified in Figure 6: the interested party (which
we christened the leader) might improve her payoff by choos-
ing a strategy, which is not stable for herself in the Nash
sense of not being able to improve the payoff by unilaterally
deviating from her strategy.
The concept of leader equilibria extends the set of rational
control objectives. It allows, for example, for mixing envi-
ronments that are rationally following their own objectives
with a hostile environment. For such environments, it provides
worst case rational results, where rational refers to the way the
rational players behave: we assume that they follow a strategy
that they do not have an incentive to deviate from.
The solutions one obtains can be used to create stable rules
that optimise various outcomes, including social optima as
well as egoistic solutions.
V. FUTURE WORK
The results of this paper can be applied to implement a
tool to analyse the behaviour of distributed systems where a
central controller along with other rational adversaries in a
system follow their objectives of maximising the utility. This
technique can be used to optimise social optima as well by
adding an objective for the controller. Possible future work
could be to implement the tool to represent this. It would
relate to solving Multi-player mean-payoff games by reduction
to the underlying two player mean-payoff games. It requires to
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implement the constraint system as described in Section III-C
and the solution is therefore tractable.
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